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Abstract: This sui generis case unmasks the deficiencies of a ‘constitution of the oceans’ that 
fails to provide an equal framework to support the single unity of archipelagos and therefore 
safeguard their economic, security and environmental interests. Certainly, archipelagos were 
not prominently featured in the traditional forums for Law of the Sea issues, as they were 
usually overshadowed by more ‘urgent’ matters. In light of the exclusion of mid-ocean 
archipelagos of mainland states from the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS, this article 
undertakes the challenge of providing a legal answer to justify the practice of the straight 
baseline method to enclose waters surrounding the Galapagos Islands. It evaluates the 
negotiation process of the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS, and suggests that the Ecuadorian 
claim cannot be sustained under Part IV. Article 7 UNCLOS and the Fisheries Case are both 
addressed as alternatives, since they provide a possible legal foundation for the claim. 
Nonetheless, it is the special circumstances surrounding the Galapagos that sustains the 
Ecuadorian claim; the immemorial exercise of jurisdiction over the waters of the archipelago, 
the tolerance of neighbouring states, and the countless declarations from international bodies 
which provide a basis for a valid historic title. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (‘UNCLOS’) succeeded in regulating 
historically controversial issues, in codifying unregulated matters, and in anticipating some of 
the challenges of the modern era, all under one framework which decades after its adoption 
shows a great degree of compliance. 
 Certainly, archipelagos were not prominently featured in the traditional forums to 
discuss the law of the sea, as they were usually overshadowed by more polemic matters at the 
time. This does not imply, however, that they were any less transcendental or free from 
debate. In fact, as they became one of the topics assigned for the attention of Sub Committee 
II,1 state practice already had ascertained the use of straight baselines to enclose groups of 
islands into a single unity, as a means of safeguarding their economic, security and 
environmental interests while endorsing their political unity, 2  which were their major 
concerns. 																																																								
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1 Myron H Nordquist (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, vol 2 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1985) 4–8. 
2 Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (CUP 2012) 108. 
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 In light of the unreasonable exclusion of mid-ocean archipelagos of mainland states 
from the archipelagic regime of the 1982 Convention, this work undertakes the challenge of 
providing an alternative legal solution for the regulation of mid-ocean archipelagos of 
mainland states, and more concretely to justify the practice surrounding the Galapagos 
Islands. It will address the rationale behind the archipelagic claims, their similarities and 
departures from the archipelagic scenarios that law has covered, with a special but not 
exclusive emphasis on UNCLOS, in contrast to the relevant rules of customary international 
law.   
 Section B aims to insert the reader into the negotiation process that preceded the 
archipelagic regime of UNCLOS and demonstrate that the debate (to the extent that any 
occurred) lacked technical and academic insight, and thus resulted in an only partial 
recognition of the archipelagic claim. It is followed by an analysis of Part IV of UNCLOS to 
resolve, in a first step, the applicability of this regime to dependent archipelagos. 
In the search for a legal basis to justify the omission of UNCLOS, section C deals 
with the different types of archipelagos recognised by law from an analysis of the transversal 
features common in every regime: straight baselines and enclosed waters. A detailed analysis 
of their legal status and the manner in which dependent archipelagos have implemented these 
elements will show parallelisms in the sense that they all seem to find legal support beyond 
article 7 of UNCLOS itself, but also in the very origins of the baseline concept established in 
the Fisheries Case.3 Whether this practice is sufficiently uniform to consolidate into a 
customary rule demands a more detailed study. Nonetheless, it sets the basis for the 
Galapagos case, which will be addressed as a final discussion of this article.  
 Section D provides an overview of the very particular circumstances that surround the 
Ecuadorian claim and how the effective and immemorial exercise of jurisdiction over the 
waters of the Archipelago sets the basis for its validity in international customary law, in the 
absence of an express provision in the oft-praised ‘constitution of the oceans’; a great 
framework currently challenged by the need to evolve for the benefit of governance of the 
oceans.   
 
B. ARCHIPELAGOS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF THE SEA 
1. The breaking point of traditional claims: a necessary background 																																																								
3 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) [1951] ICJ 116; Robin Rolf Churchill and Alan Vaughn Lowe, 
The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, MUP 1999) 118. 
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Although the claims for an archipelagic regime were manifest in the early meetings of the 
Sea-Bed Committee back in 1968,4 the proposal for a special status was far from unexpected 
since it had already been ascertained, in different degrees, by a number of entities. Among 
them, the Institut de Droit International, the International Law Association, the American 
Institute of International Law, the Harvard Research in International Law, the International 
Law Commission,5 and even the 1930 Hague Codification Conference and the 1958 Geneva 
Conference, where this topic was discussed, with no positive outcome.6  
 The wide scope of complex issues to be addressed in the Third Conference and the 
need to reach an effective legal agreement called for a unique and skillful deliberation 
process, 7  from which Tanaka has identified five major characteristics: consensus, the 
package-deal approach, informal meetings, the single-text approach and the group approach; 
the latter of particular importance for this work.8 
 Unofficially, Member States of the United Nations have been categorised in Regional 
Groups, a system that often operates in international relations, diplomacy and multilateral 
forums, including the UNCLOS III.9 However, their influence in this Conference was limited 
to a secondary role due to the diversity of views and positions of its members over 
substantive matters, which naturally evolved in the emergence of the so-called New Special 
Interest Groups.10 The common denominator of a shared interest turned the Groups into a 
highly influential force that succeeded in developing a common agenda through a well-
organised structure, and regular and often informal meetings.11  
 The Group of Archipelagic States, integrated by Indonesia, the Philippines, Mauritius 
and Fiji, led the discussion in favor of a special regime. Their active participation was 
essential in the law-making process and in drafting Part IV of UNCLOS. In fact, they put 
forward a number of documents and informal working papers that set the basis for an intense 
negotiation process.  
 Among these contributions, the Draft Articles Relating to Archipelagic States is often 
mentioned as a well-accepted document that reconciled the views of navigating states with 																																																								
4 Nordquist (n 1) 3. 
5 Eward Duncan Brown, The International Law of the Sea: Introductory Manual Volume I (Dartmouth 1994) 
102–103. 
6 Churchill and Lowe (n 3) 118. 
7 Tommy Koh and Shanmugam Jayakumar, ‘The Negotiating Process of the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea’ in Myron H Nordquist (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary. vol I (Martinus Nijhoff 1985) 31. 
8 Tanaka (n 2) 27–29. 
9 Nordquist (n 1) 68. 
10 ibid 69. 
11 Nordquist (n 1) 68. 
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the sponsors’ interests.12 However, little is said about the amendments that this text included 
in comparison with a previous proposal presented to the Sea-Bed Committee.13  
More specifically, the crucial replacement of the word ‘mainly’ for ‘wholly’ in article 1, 
which produced a provision in the following terms: ‘An archipelagic State is a State 
constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands’. This small 
change with huge implications suggests an intention to deliberately exclude outlying 
dependent archipelagos from the envisaged archipelagic regime of the emerging UNCLOS, a 
view expressed by the Indonesian delegation.14   
 This amendment generated a parallel debate against a diverse group of states, which 
supported the indivisible nature of archipelagos and rightfully contended that the non-
recognition of a similar reality would turn archipelagos belonging to a mixed State into a 
‘second class territory’,15 unable to benefit from an adequate regime to protect their interests 
to the same extent that archipelagic states could.  
 In this context, Canada, Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, New 
Zealand and Norway introduced a Working Paper16 that was broadly supported by a number 
of coastal and island states, like Portugal, Spain, Argentina, Honduras, Peru and certainly 
Ecuador, in defense of its position in respect of the Galapagos.17  
 This extensive set of draft articles included a well-balanced regime for the enclosed 
waters and reasonable guidelines for the drawing of straight baselines in an almost identical 
way as it is now reflected in the UNCLOS. However, it was the section applicable to 
‘archipelagos forming part of a coastal State’ which provoked discontent and debate among 
the parties. The Official Records of the UNCLOS III evidence this disagreement; indeed, the 
different formulas proposed in the Working Paper of the Second Committee show that these 
approaches were as controversial as they were irreconcilable.18  
																																																								
12 ‘Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and Philippines: draft articles relating to archipelagic states’ Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (9 August 1974) UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/L.49. 
13 ‘Summary records of meetings of the Second Committee, 36th meeting’ Third United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (12 August 1974) UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.36, intervention of Mr Djalal (Indonesia) 
260. 
14 ibid. 
15 ‘Summary records of meetings of the Second Committee, 37th meeting’ Third United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (12 August 1974) UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.37, intervention of Mr Limpo Serra 
(Portugal) 266. 
16 ‘Canada, Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway: working paper’ 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (26 July 1974) UN Doc A/CONF.62/L.4. 
17 Summary records (n 15).  
18 ‘Statement of activities of the Conference during its first and second sessions prepared by the Rapporteur-
general: Mr. Kenneth O Rattray (Jamaica)’ Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (17 October 
1974) UN Doc A/CONF.62/L.8/Rev.1. 
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 Section 2, entitled ‘Oceanic Archipelagos belonging to Continental States’, was 
eventually removed from the Informal Single Negotiating Text,19 and as a result left outside 
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text,20 present day article 46.21 This suggests that 
further negotiations were held; unfortunately, these negotiations included only the group of 
archipelagic states and maritime powers.22 This lobbying created discomfort among other 
participants, to the point that President Amerasinghe had to appeal to the groups to have 
fewer of their private meetings and more inter-group reunions in order to accommodate other 
proposals.23 These private negotiations sought to accelerate and secure the adoption of a 
special regime for archipelagic states by any means; ironically, a regime that was traditionally 
advocated by continental states with archipelagos as part of their territory and not by 
archipelagic states.24 The latter started these claims once they gained independence from their 
colonial powers, whose attention was naturally focused in maintaining the freedom of 
navigation on the high seas 
2. Part IV: the narrow aftermath of a magnificent Convention 
For the purpose of determining an archipelagic regime, states needed to agree on a formula to 
define the term ‘archipelago’ and set the basis for the applicable rules. In the simplest form, 
they are a ‘group of islands’ or ‘a sea stretch of water containing many islands’ according to 
the Oxford Dictionary; no source provides further detail in respect of the nature of their 
elements, their size, number and other technical considerations.  
 Although the legal connotations of an archipelagic concept was not a priority in the 
early discussions of the law of the sea, it was a matter of study for a number of authors. 
Hodgson and Alexander, in their Occasional Paper for the Law of the Sea Institute, stated that 
archipelagos are ‘an example of special circumstances’.25 In previous years, Evensen had 
already contributed with a groundbreaking piece of work that accurately described the 
different situations in which these formations could be found, and highlighted the 
complexities of constructing a geo-juridical definition.26 In his contribution, he addressed a 
number of physical possibilities (number, size, position and shape of archipelagos, their 																																																								
19 ‘Informal single negotiating text, part II’ Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (17 March 
to 9 May 1975) UN Doc A/CONF.62/WP.8/PartII. 
20 ‘Informal Composite Negotiating Text’ Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (15 July 
1977) UN Doc A/CONF.62.WP.10. 
21 Nordquist (n 1) 412. 
22 ibid 402. 
23 Koh and Jayakumar (n 7) 85–86. 
24 Sophia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 24. 
25 Phiphat Tangsubkul and Daniel J Dzurek, ‘The Emerging Concept of Midocean Archipelagos’ (1982) 3(1) 
Ocean YB 386, 392. 
26 ibid 391. 
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islands and islets) and distinguished coastal and outlying archipelagos.27 However, a more 
general formula was required in order to cover both types of archipelagos, and so he 
concluded in the basic construct of archipelagos as ‘a formation of two or more islands, islets 
or rockets, which geographically may be considered as a whole’.28 Despite his efforts, his 
document was not considered in UNCLOS I.  
 Art 46(b) of the 1982 Convention, on the other hand, provides a more detailed 
provision and defines archipelagos as the following: 
A group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural 
features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features 
form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been 
regarded as such.29 
Geographic unity implies adjacency among the elements of an archipelago, economic unity 
refers to the dependency link between the enclosed waters and the population, and political 
unity attributes the features of the archipelago to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the same 
State.30 Thus, UNCLOS departs from a merely geophysical formula and incorporates several 
non-tangible considerations in a fiction that still highlights the unity of archipelagos as their 
distinctive feature.31  
 Article 46(a) relies on this definition as a starting point to create the object of Part IV 
of the UNCLOS, and provides that an archipelagic State is ‘a State constituted wholly by one 
or more archipelagos and may include other islands’.  
 Considering that there are as many archipelagic realities as geographic features 
composing this group of islands, the task of arriving at a single definition to address all of 
them presents a highly complex challenge. However, one can affirm that geographically, 
archipelagos can be found under two scenarios: a) lying immediately close to the coast of a 
mainland State, also known as coastal archipelagos32 (eg the Norwegian Skjaergaard, and 
those by the coasts of Finland, Greenland, Sweden, Yugoslavia and certain stretches on the 
coasts of Canada and Alaska);33 b) as an outlying distant group of islands that cannot possibly 																																																								
27 ibid 392. 
28 ibid. 
29 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS). 
30 Sophia Kopela, ‘2007 Archipelagic Legislation of the Dominican Republic: An Assessment’ (2009) 24(3) The 
Intl J of Marine & Coastal L 504. 
31 Tangsubkul and Dzurek (n 25) 393. 
32 Tara Davenport, ‘The Archipelagic Regime’ in Donald R Rothwell and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
the Law of the Sea (OUP 2015) 135. 
33 Mohamed Munavvar, Ocean States: Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 15. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.089 
 
  77 
be considered as bordering the coastline of the mainland State,34 generally identified as mid-
ocean archipelagos. The latter, subject to the juridical consideration of statehood, could form 
part of the territory of a continental State (the Faroe Islands in Denmark, the Andaman and 
Nicobar in India, the Azores in Portugal, and the Galapagos in Ecuador), or comprise by itself 
the entire territory of a State (eg Indonesia, the Philippines. Fiji).35 
 As Part IV of the UNCLOS was approved under the heading ‘Archipelagic States’, it 
clearly ratifies that its applicability is limited to archipelagos that constitute a State on their 
own. Clearly, there is a fragmentation in the geographic, cultural and social reality, and the 
intention to come with a solution based on a political consideration; especially when 
archipelagos constitute a natural unity facing similar threats. These threats relate particularly 
to security and the prevention of illicit activities such as smuggling, illegal fishing, inter-
island traffic and environmental concerns.36 This limitation amounts to ‘an unnecessary and 
unreasonable restriction’.37  
 In the early stages of negotiation, navigating states showed special concern in 
preventing an abusive application of archipelagic principles to include vast parts of the ocean 
as part of national territory.38 Thus, they strongly defended a mathematical criterion over a 
qualitative approach (which allows for more permissible adjacency considerations) for the 
drawing of baselines. Article 47 cleverly incorporates these two objectives and aims to 
prevent potential arbitrariness in the application of straight baselines around a group of 
islands. Nonetheless, as Brown suggests, the clear tendency to favor a numerical approach is 
undeniable.  
 A joint analysis of articles 46 and 47 evidences that while there are no objective 
criteria to be followed by states to declare themselves as an Archipelagic State, they must 
comply with the strict numerical approach of article 47 (water-land ratio and maximum 
length of straight baselines) if they want to benefit from a straight baseline drawing. In other 
words, a mere declaration of status as an Archipelagic State does not give rise to an 
entitlement to apply the regime prescribed in Part IV.39 As ascertained by Brown, this status 
is useless unless a State also satisfies the requirements in article 47 to draw archipelagic 
baselines, and thus profit from the archipelagic regime in respect of enclosed waters.  
																																																								
34 Davenport (n 32) 135. 
35 ibid 135–136. 
36 Churchill and Lowe (n 3) 119. 
37 ibid 120. 
38 Nordquist (n 1) 401. 
39 Brown (n 5) 112. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.089 
 
  78 
 The result is an international instrument that not only excludes a considerable number 
of dependent archipelagos from its provisions (eg the Canaries in Spain, the Faeroes in 
Denmark, Svalbard in Norway, the Tuamotu in France, the Azores in Portugal, Andaman and 
Nicobar in India, and the Galapagos in Ecuador); but also allows anomalous40 situations to 
take place, even for State archipelagos which qualify as such under article 46. The 
homogenous nature of archipelagos is fragmented by the pressure to comply with the 
numerical requirements in article 47. UNCLOS prescribes for State archipelagos to be 
composed by ‘one or more archipelagos’; this means that an archipelagic State whose entire 
territory does not satisfy the quantitative requirements has the option to divide its group of 
islands into more than one archipelago, each with its own straight baselines regime. Although 
this enables it to benefit from the archipelagic regime of Part IV, the very elements of unity 
and integration of its territory are disregarded due to a strictly legal consideration.41 
 Since UNCLOS III followed a different pattern from its predecessors and did not rely 
on the previous work of the ILC,42 its outcome mainly responds to political rather than 
strictly academic considerations.43 Regrettably, it missed the opportunity to legally cover all 
types of archipelagos under a single, coherent and clear regime as it does not make any 
express reference to mid-ocean or coastal archipelagos. The latter, although in practice 
covered by the provisions on straight baselines,44 cannot be strictly equated to a ‘fringe of 
islands’ in the terms of article 7 of the UNCLOS, as stated by Kopela. This is mainly so 
because an archipelago implies a close interaction between the islands it comprises, while a 
fringe of islands is only required to have a close relation and vicinity with the nearby coast 
and its waters, as pointed out in the 1951 Fisheries Case.45 Nonetheless, the main difference 
between coastal and mid-ocean archipelagos responds solely to geographic considerations, 
but both certainly share the same economic, political and historic identity inherent in 
archipelagos, which are compelling reasons why they ought to have been addressed equally 




40 ibid 109. 
41 ibid 110. 
42 Koh and Jayakumar (n 7) 29 
43 Summary records (n 13) intervention of Mr Tolentino (Philippines) 265. 
44 Churchill and Lowe (n 3) 120. 
45 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) (n 3); Kopela (n 24) 71. 
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C. COASTAL ARCHIPELAGOS, ARCHIPELAGIC STATES AND MID-OCEAN 
ARCHIPELAGOS OF NON-ARCHIPELAGIC STATES: LEGAL STATUS OF 
BASELINES AND ENCLOSED WATERS 
Despite a special archipelagic regime in UNCLOS, this instrument failed to address all types 
of archipelagos under a uniform system. While coastal archipelagos are legitimated on the 
basis of article 4(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention and article 7(1) of the UNCLOS, 
archipelagic states find their legal support in Part IV of UNCLOS. On the contrary, the lack 
of a specific provision for mid-ocean dependent archipelagos has not impeded mainland 
states from proceeding with an analogous practice and connecting their insular features with 
straight baselines and claiming a special regime in the enclosed waters.  
 There are different types of archipelagos, each of which forms the subject of diverse 
and substantial State practice. However, the protection sought by states and the one provided 
by law can be simplified in the unification of the insular features by the use of straight 
baselines, over which enclosed waters the State exercises sovereignty. Precisely, baselines 
and enclosed waters are the elements that persuade states to identify a ‘fringe of islands along 
the coast in its immediate vicinity’ as a coastal archipelago, or to claim the status of 
archipelagic State. They are highly motivated by the exercise of sovereignty over the 
enclosed waters.  
1. Baselines 
Their importance is functional, as they constitute the starting point to measure the different 
maritime zones, to delimit overlapping areas with neighbouring states, and hence to 
determine the applicable regime and the extent of the rights and duties to be exercised by the 
coastal State over each maritime space.46 
 As a reminder, international law has identified two types of baselines: the low-water 
line, referred in both the Geneva Convention and the UNCLOS as ‘normal baseline’; and the 
artificial straight baselines, for which the applicable provisions are comprised in article 4 of 
the Geneva Convention and article 7 of the UNCLOS. 
 The first method is the line that follows the sinuosities of the coast, a simple formula 
that has barely represented any conflict, misinterpretation or abuse by coastal states.47 
International law has granted a discretionary power to states regarding this matter, which are 
																																																								
46 Coalter G Lathrop, ‘Baselines’ in Donald R Rothwell and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of 
the Sea (OUP 2015) 70. 
47 ibid 79. 
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not required to deposit any chart of scales, geographical coordinates of points or geodetic 
datum before the UN Secretary-General, as required for straight baselines.48  
 Moreover, under Part VIII of UNCLOS, islands have been recognised with the same 
maritime spaces applicable to land territory, and the normal baseline is implied to be the 
method to start measuring these zones. Before a Convention that has no express provision to 
address the situation of dependent archipelagos, this appears to be the only valid drawing in 
the eyes of states that oppose the inclusion of dependent archipelagos under the protection of 
a straight baseline system, such as the United States, which has implemented this system to 
delimit the Hawaiian Islands.  
 This is also supported by the fact that the normal baseline has long been argued to be 
the general rule, as it showed to be the preferred method in early codification forums such as 
the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, and its provision has remained intact in both the 
1958 and the 1982 Conventions. Moreover, both instruments appear to favour the low-water 
line as the default mechanism for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea,49 implied by the 
use of phrases such as ‘except where otherwise provided in these articles’ or ‘except where 
otherwise provided in this Convention’, respectively.   
 Straight baselines, on the other hand, are the artificial construct created for the 
purpose of facilitating the measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea where the 
coastline is significantly irregular or has the presence of certain features that require a special 
set of rules to ascertain a more precise starting point. They found their formal and legal 
recognition in the international scenario as a valid method to be implemented under certain 
circumstances in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, in 1951.50  
 In its pleadings, Norway repeatedly stressed the fact that its geographic peculiarities 
called for a different regime than the low-water mark. The ICJ responded positively to this 
claim by concluding that in these circumstances ‘the line of the low-water mark can no longer 
be put forward as a rule requiring the coastline to be followed in all its sinuosities’.51 It added 
that such a rugged coast would require countless derogations that the rule would disappear. 
Hence, such a coast called for the application of a reasonable but different method, one that 
departs from the physical line of the coast.52  
																																																								
48 UNCLOS arts 16, 47(8)–(9). 
49 Lathrop (n 46) 74. 
50 Mohamed Munavvar, Ocean States: Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 69. 
51 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) (n 3). 
52 ibid 129. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.089 
 
  81 
 This judgment was incorporated near verbatim into the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and UNCLOS. Although they do not refer explicitly 
to coastal archipelagos, a ‘fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity’53 seems 
to be a widening of the language used by the ICJ in the Fisheries Case which,54 Churchill 
agrees, seems to be enough to cover coastal archipelagos.55 
 Once a number of geographical conditions have been satisfied, both Conventions 
require for ‘economic interests peculiar to the region concerned … evidenced by a long 
usage’ to be considered,56 which reinforces the ICJ’s view respecting the historic fishing and 
hunting rights of the local Norwegian population, without prejudice to other activities such as 
tourism, communication and mining that could also be framed under economic interests.57  
 As for their legal status, the fact that the UNCLOS incorporated the text of the 1958 
Convention in almost identical terms as the ICJ formulated its judgment in the Fisheries 
Case, leads to the conclusion that the rules governing straight baselines have become part of 
the body of customary international law. As Churchill and Lowe assert: ‘the provisions of 
UNCLOS have, to the extent that they differ from the rules of customary rule before 1958 
[and only in respect of those provisions that have continued from the Geneva Convention to 
the LOSC] passed into customary law’.58 Contrarily, based on the inconsistent State practice,  
this method can also be argued not to be customary international law.59 Despite these 
contrasting opinions, this question seems to have lost relevance, considering the elevated 
number of states party to one or the other convention.60 For the purpose of this study, the lack 
of univocal content of these norms constitutes a weakness in the system that could potentially 
uphold the application of straight baselines in mid-ocean archipelagos of mainland states.61   
 In contrast, article 47 displays a set of objective rules, two of them with a clear 
numerical approach (water-land ratio and maximum length of the baselines), that aim to 
prevent arbitrariness of archipelagic states.62   
 Regarding the water-land ratio, article 47(1) has established that it shall be ‘between 1 
to 1 and 9 to 1’. This provision prevents states such as the UK, Australia and Cuba from 																																																								
53 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 
10 September 1964) 2005 UNTS 516, art 4(1); UNCLOS art 7(1). 
54 Munavvar (n 50). 
55 Churchill and Lowe (n 3) 120. 
56 1958 Geneva Convention art 4(4); UNCLOS art 7(5). 
57 Munavvar (n 50) 124–125. 
58 Churchill and Lowe (n 3) 53–54. 
59 Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing 2010) 51. 
60 Churchill and Lowe (n 3) 53. 
61 Kopela (n 24) 148. 
62 Lathrop (n 46) 88–89. 
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drawing archipelagic straight baselines, because the lower ratio excludes archipelagos 
‘dominated by one or two large islands or islands that are connected only by comparatively 
small sea areas’.63 However, they could consider their surrounding islands as though they 
were coastal archipelagos along a mainland coast, and therefore ‘tie them to the main island’ 
by straight baselines.64 On the other hand, the upper ratio excludes archipelagos which are 
integrated by dispersed islands, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati.65  
 As for their length, article 47(2) provides a maximum of 100 nautical miles and, 
exceptionally, 125 miles. This is clearly different than the provisions in article 4 of the 
Geneva Convention and 7 of UNCLOS, where no limit has been established. The qualitative 
provisions of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of article 47, on the other hand, are clear repetitions of the 
rules contained in both Conventions, which corroborates Munavvar’s description of article 47 
as one that has included ‘something borrowed and something new’.66  
2. Enclosed waters 
Their legal status and applicable regime varies according to the nature of the baselines 
surrounding them. In other words, under Part IV of UNCLOS, the archipelagic State has been 
granted sovereignty over the enclosed waters and its resources as a concession to secure a 
number of rights in favour of navigating states. Conversely, the waters on the landward side 
of the straight baselines drawn according to articles 4 of the Geneva Convention and 7 of 
UNCLOS, are internal waters, thus subject to less constraints than those recognised as 
archipelagic.67   
 In the first scenario, states are allowed to exercise sovereignty over the waters 
enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, their bed, subsoil and corresponding air space68 in a 
similar regime as that of the territorial sea, in the sense that there is recognition of 
navigational rights.69 These rights comprise innocent passage for ships of all states, in 
accordance to the rules prescribed in Part II for the territorial sea; and archipelagic sea lanes 
passage. If an archipelagic state decides to implement these routes, due publicity must be 
given to the axis of the sea lanes and the respective traffic separation schemes to ensure the 
safe passage of ships.70 However, archipelagic states are not obliged to establish such sea 																																																								
63 Tanaka (n 2) 111. 
64 Munavvar (n 50) 136. 
65 Tanaka (n 2) 111. 
66 Munavvar (n 50) 138. 
67 ibid 136. 
68 UNCLOS art 49(1)–(2). 
69 Munavvar (n 50) 155. 
70 UNCLOS art 53(7)–(10). 
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lanes,71 in which case the right to transit through the routes normally used for international 
navigation remains valid (article 53(12)). Likewise, it seems that there is no obligation for 
ships to use the designated sea lanes either, as Brown alleges; in which case, they will not 
benefit from this right as it allows, for example, navigation ‘in the normal mode’ (article 
53(3)).72   
 In relation to internal waters, they can result from the application of straight baselines 
to link coastal archipelagos to the mainland, according to Part II of UNCLOS, or under Part 
VII, when the archipelagic State delimits internal waters within its archipelagic waters. In 
both scenarios, sovereignty over this space is not subject to any obligations towards third 
states (contrary to the territorial sea regime). However, as a matter of customary international 
law, it might be argued that there is a right of access to ports,73 as well as innocent passage 
where the straight baseline has enclosed waters that were not previously considered as such.74     
 Although the regime of archipelagic waters shares some similarities with that of the 
territorial sea, it was included in UNCLOS as a sui generis category subject to a wider set of 
exceptions, in order to balance the interests of navigating and archipelagic states. As Morgan 
describes: ‘the archipelagic regime is more of a second cousin to the territorial sea than an 
identical twin’.75 Without going any further, this essay requires a clear understanding of both 
regimes in order to sustain the Galapagos claim. For this reason, it will be briefly concluded 
that the enclosed waters of coastal archipelagos seem to be well established in international 
law as internal waters, through conventional and customary rules.76 As for the legal status of 
archipelagic waters, they appear to have become part of customary international law, as 
well.77 Despite the fact that the rules on passage through archipelagic waters were developed 
as part of an entirely new concept in UNCLOS, consensus, State practice, and the fact that 
the rules of passage through the territorial sea are well established as custom, have proved 
that this regime has indeed passed into the body of customary law.78  
3. State practice 
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75 A L Morgan, ‘The New Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Implications for Sovereign Jurisdiction and Freedom 
of Action’ (1996) 27(1–2) Ocean Dev & Intl L 5, 15. 
76 Munavvar (n 50) 147. 
77 Churchill and Lowe (n 3) 129. 
78 Brown (n 5) 122. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.089 
 
  84 
Unofficially, the UN estimates that approximately 22 states have claimed archipelagic status 
on the basis of article 46 of the UNCLOS.79 More than 20 years after the convention entered 
into force, the aftermath shows that the set of provisions of Part IV, especially the objective 
criteria of article 47, has been satisfactorily complied, with very few exceptions.80  
 For instance Indonesia, despite being one of the states leading the archipelagic claims 
during UNCLOS III, surprisingly did not deposit a complete and revised set of its 
archipelagic baselines system until 2009.81 Similarly, the Philippines, after the continuous 
objections of Australia, Russia and the US, finally enacted Act No 9522 to define the 
baselines of the Philippine archipelago, in accordance with UNCLOS.82 Nonetheless, they did 
not refer to the legal status of the enclosed waters, which have traditionally held a category of 
internal waters under domestic legislation;83 at least until a legislative decision is taken 
regarding the Philippines Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act.84 
 In contrast to the mostly uniform compliance of Part IV, there is a considerable 
amount of practice of continental states with outlying archipelagos that entails a more 
problematic analysis. Kopela has interestingly synthesised this praxis into the following.  
 First, there is the group of states with ‘one [or two] large islands surrounded by 
smaller insular dependencies’ 85  which have applied the provisions concerning coastal 
archipelagos,86 and thus rely on a straight baseline system to connect the relatively close 
islands to the coast of the main islands. Such is the case of the Kerleguen Islands in France, 
the Svalbard Archipelago in Norway and the Sjaelland and Laeso Islands in Denmark,87 to 
mention a few. This analogy is deemed to be valid under a more flexible interpretation of the 
norms prescribed for coastal archipelagos, especially when there is no specific rule regarding 
																																																								
79 Table of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction as at 15 July 2011 (United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea). 
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83 Philippines Republic Act No 3046 of 17 June 1961 (An Act to define the baselines of the territorial sea of the 
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the adjacency, compactness and location of the islands in relation to the coast.88 Indeed, it is 
the vague language in their writing that allows this wide breadth of claims.  
 On the other hand, Kopela has identified a parallel practice of non-archipelagic states, 
which islands cannot possibly be considered as fringing the coastline due to their distant 
location, such as the Galapagos.89 Or the Houtman Abrolhos Islands in Australia, which 
despite being connected by short straight baselines, the coastal archipelago regime is 
inapplicable to them due to the absence of a main island to support the presence of the rest of 
the features as a fringe along its coastline.90 Similar claims take place in the Faroe Islands in 
Denmark, the Azores and Madeira in Portugal, and the Canary and Balearic Islands in 
Spain,91 where not even the most generous interpretation of the provisions for coastal 
archipelagos could support these claims.  
 Finally, Kopela highlights the practice of states which do not consider their outlying 
dependent islands as a whole, thus each one of them is delimited by normal baselines. This 
practice, however, is not uniform; rather it responds to individual considerations of each 
State, which in some cases have preferred to draw straight baselines connecting their outlying 
islands, and in others they have opted for the normal baseline system.92 Such is the case of 
the UK, which uses a geometric construction in the Falkland Islands as opposing to normal 
baselines in the Virgin Islands and the Bermudas.93 Likewise, Australia has a similar dual 
approach in respect to the Houtman and Abrolhos Islands, and the Cocos Islands.94 
 There is also the uniform practice of the United States, which has traditionally been 
opposed to a special regime for dependent archipelagos, insisting that each island should be 
considered as an individual feature, subject to a normal baseline drawing only.95 Quite 
coherent under the view that the US, despite not being a State party to the UNCLOS, has 
exercised a persistent objector role regarding maritime claims in different parts of the globe 
and their consistency with international law.96   
 Considering this study, it is reasonable to conclude that UNCLOS (and its 
predecessor) fail to provide a solid ground to justify the claims of continental states in their 																																																								
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dependent outlying archipelagos. Nonetheless, this does not seem to have been the intention 
behind these proclamations.97 As many scholars agree, the lack of a specific provision to 
cover dependent archipelagos has not impeded states in connecting their insular features 
through straight baselines and enclosing them as a whole.98 Indeed, leaving aside the 
statehood requirement of article 46(a), a great majority of mid-ocean dependent archipelagos 
comply with the definition of article 46(b). 99  Therefore, the practice of states with 
archipelagos suggests that, given the lacuna100 in the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS, their 
claims could be legally justified on the basis of customary international law.101  
 
D. THE GALAPAGOS ISLANDS: THE VALID CLAIM OF A SUI GENERIS CASE 
1. Setting the basis 
The islands are located at a distance of 972 km off the west of the Ecuadorian coast, in the 
Pacific Ocean. Also, known as Archipiélago de Colón, is one of the 24 provinces of the 
Republic of Ecuador, to which they appertain since 1832, when they were annexed by its first 
president.102  
 The archipelago encompasses 5 main islands with an area that exceeds 500 km2 
(Isabela, Santa Cruz, Fernandina, San Salvador, and San Cristóbal), where also most of the 
population of the archipelago is concentrated (around 25,000 people, mostly of Ecuadorian 
origin), plus 8 smaller islands whose areas range from 14 to 173 km2, 6 minor islands 
between 1 and 5 km2, 42 islets with an area of less than 1 km2 and 26 rocks, for a total of 
8,010 km2 of land.103   
 This ‘living museum and showcase of evolution’, as remarked by UNESCO, is 
recognised worldwide for its outstandingly rich flora and fauna. The uniqueness of their 
species and their ability to adapt to the environment of each island caught the attention of the 
naturalist Charles Darwin back in 1835, who found in the Galapagos a great source of 
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knowledge and an important contribution to his evolutionary theory of natural selection, 
reflected in On the Origin of Species.104  
 Furthermore, the biodiversity of this scenario granted the Galapagos Islands the 
UNESCO World Heritage status in 1978,105 under the following criteria:  
(vii) natural phenomena or beauty;  
(viii) major stages of earth’s history;  
(ix) significant ecological and biological processes; and  
(x) significant natural habitat for biodiversity.106  
It also integrates the List of Biosphere Reserves for its outstanding universal value, since 
1984.107   
 However, it was not only one of the first properties to hold UNESCO recognition, but 
was also included in the List of World Heritage in Danger in 2007, due to the illegal 
industrial over-fishing, especially that related to shark finning motivated by the high demand 
in overseas market, the introduction of invasive alien species, population growth related to 
tourism and other factors which sadly lead to extinction.108 This awakening prompted 
Ecuador to strengthen its response to protect the Galapagos and take a number of measures, 
including a constitutional amendment, which contributed to their removal from the list in 
2010.109 
 Nonetheless, the many risks threatening this particularly vulnerable area are latent and 
the Ecuadorian government has been called upon to implement a coherent set of policies, 
resource management and activity control over the basis of a strong legislation to mitigate the 
ongoing risk, and to preserve this environment and its population.  
 Indeed, it was under similar considerations, but certainly less serious threats, that 
Ecuador recognised the ecological value of the Galapagos and enacted domestic legislation 
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declaring the inviolability of its reserved areas in 1934 and 1936,110 signed the 1952 
Declaration on the Maritime Zone along with Peru and Chile,111 established the Galapagos 
National Park in 1959,112 officially specified the straight baseline points from where the 
territorial sea would be measured in 1971,113 categorised the Islands as a Province in 1973,114 
created the Marine Resources Reserve in 1986, 115  requested from the IMO a special 
protective regime in 2005, declared a special governance regime to administer the Galapagos 
at a constitutional level, 116  and now even potentially submits a project to extend its 
continental shelf beyond 200 miles before the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf and so extend its sovereign rights over this area. 
 
 
Straight Baselines in accordance with the Supreme Decree N 959-A. 
Source: Oceanographic Institute of the Navy of the Republic of Ecuador. 																																																								
110 Ecuador Presidential Decree N.697, Official Registry N.257 (21 August 1934); and Supreme Decree N.31, 
Official Registry N.189 (14 May 1936), Sofia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (n 24) 
200. 
111 Santiago Declaration (Ecuador, Peru and Chile) (adopted 18 August 1952, entered into force for Ecuador 7 
February 1955) art IV. 
112 Ecuador Emergency Executive Decree N.17, Official Registry N.873 (20 July 1959). 
113 Ecuador Supreme Decree N.959-A (28 July 1971). 
114 Ecuador Supreme Decree N.164, Official Registry N.256 (28 February 1973). 
115 Ecuador Decree N. 1810-A, Official Registry N.434 (13 May 1986). 
116 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2007. 
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 Interestingly, all of these declarations have been made on the basis of the Galapagos 
as a single unity, bordered by territorial waters measured from the outermost points of the 
outermost islands. Thus, the rights of foreign vessels have been restricted in favour of 
Ecuador and its interests. Worthy of note so as to understand Ecuador’s historical attitude 
towards this issue is that even more declarations have been made at a constitutional level, 
where the Galapagos have been expressly recognised as a whole, since 1835.117  
2. A shift from baselines to historic waters 
a) Baselines 
The fact that a number of group of islands comply, in theory, with the archipelagic definition 
of article 46(b), does not entail the right to invoke an archipelagic State status when the very 
elements of statehood are missing.118 This goes beyond the aim of the UNCLOS rule, 
designed to exclude dependent archipelagos, or the Galapagos for this effect.  
 Considering that Ecuador officially enacted its straight archipelagic baseline system in 
1971, when UNCLOS III was still in its early confirmation stages and an archipelagic State 
regime was completely non-existent in conventional international law, the Galapagos case 
cannot possibly be sustained under the legal basis of Part IV,119 which might also be 
considered to contravene the spirit of article 300 of UNCLOS as it could be viewed as an 
abuse of rights.   
 Nonetheless, while oceanic dependent archipelagos do not comply with the strict 
language of Part IV, it is not entirely incorrect to propose that they comply, on the other hand, 
with the more flexible approach of article 7; a set of provisions that have been drafted in a 
subjective manner and allow the coastal State a broader margin of interpretation in the 
drawing of straight baselines.120  
 However, to analyse article 7 of UNCLOS is to go back to the Geneva Convention 
itself, especially if considering the 1971 Ecuadorian Decree in a context where the 1958 
Convention was the rule governing the seas. Despite Ecuador not being a State party to the 
Geneva Convention, the fact that this instrument did not exactly prohibit the application of 
straight baselines to enclose a group of islands, suggests that it did not constitute an unlawful 
practice under general international law.121  																																																								
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  Moreover, the provisions concerning straight baselines find their legal basis in the 
Fisheries Case. This judgment has not only influenced further State practice, but has found 
continuity in both the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, besides providing the very basis for the 
archipelagic states regime during the UNCOS III.122  
As such, the implementation of straight baselines to enclose mid-ocean dependent 
archipelagos has been suggested to be valid under international law if analogously applied to 
the ICJ Judgment. 123  Although an interesting contribution, I must argue that the 
dissimilarities between coastal and oceanic archipelagos outweigh any resemblance between 
these archipelagos and thus any potential attempt to apply these criteria to the Galapagos. 
Nevertheless, the Fisheries Case should not be entirely dismissed, as it brought an equally 
important element into consideration, one that could effectively sustain the Galapagos case: 
historic waters.   
 As for straight baselines, the ICJ Judgement is indeed broad in some of its content and 
provides a subjective approach to the matter by avoiding any mathematical guidance,124 to the 
point that a significant number of states have relied on these criteria, despite a reiterative 
protest of vigilant states such as the US.125 A superficial reading of this Judgment leads to the 
conclusion that as long as the coastal State reasonably complies with the ICJ considerations, 
the drawing of straight baselines are deemed to be valid under international law, regardless of 
their length.126  
 This argument is partially correct, to the extent that it is applied around a fringe or 
group of islands at a relatively close distance from the coastline. As far as mid-ocean 
archipelagos are concerned, this analogy is challenging and hard to sustain, starting from the 
fact that the case submitted before the ICJ was not concerned with off-shore archipelagos in 
the first place.127 Although there is no objective provision to determine the exact distance the 
islands must be located from the coastline, it must be recalled that the Court relied on the fact 
that that the Norwegian coast was fringed by these islands, in a manner that they bordered a 
majority of the coastline simulating a masking effect.128 Evidently, this is not the case with 
the Galapagos in relation to the continental territory of Ecuador. Thus the application of 																																																								
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straight baselines in analogy to coastal archipelagos in the Fisheries Case, and in application 
of article 4(1) of the Geneva Convention and article 7(1) of UNCLOS, is not an appropriate 
option for Ecuador.  
 Finally, there is some quite interesting reasoning underpinning the ICJ Judgment, as it 
is the land domain that ‘confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coasts’.129 
This is the key point that prevents mid-ocean archipelagos being equated to coastal 
archipelagos: the dominance of the coastline over the sea, the immediate distance that 
subordinates islands and waters to the land domain. 130  This differs from mid-ocean 
archipelagos, where there is no dominant coastline as a point of reference, but rather a water-
based analysis;131 which arguably can sustain the Galapagos claim and which should focus on 
historic, immemorial, long-standing considerations of Ecuador over the waters that it has 
enclosed and use them as a starting point to explain the implementation of a straight baseline 
method as the only logical drawing method to safeguard their interests.  
b) Historic title over waters 
Ecuador has traditionally considered the enclosed waters of the Galapagos as internal, 
suggesting on a narrow first view that it does not comply with the rights accommodated for 
third states in Part IV of UNCLOS. While it is correct that any limitation to the sovereignty 
of a State has to clearly emanate from a rule of international law as it cannot be presumed, in 
accordance with the PCIJ decision in the Lotus case,132 it is also incorrect to affirm that 
Ecuador does not comply with international law on the basis of the UNCLOS framework, as 
this work argues that it has no intention to validate its practice under these provisions in the 
first place. 
 Likewise, ‘a State may not plead its municipal law as a defense to avoid its 
obligations under international law’,133 thus the freedom of navigation and other related rights 
cannot be impeded in archipelagic waters through national legislation. Again, this is 
inapplicable to the Galapagos, because Ecuador does not base its claim in the terms of Part 
IV. Hence, it is not under an obligation to designate sea lanes passage and any other right 
prescribed in UNCLOS. 
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 The Ecuadorian practice must be validated from its immemorial and unequivocal 
consideration of the Galapagos as a single geographic, territorial and political unity, whose 
enclosed waters have traditionally been treated as internal.134  
 In this regard, the specific scope and terms for the acquisition of historic waters have 
not been expressly prescribed in any of the law of the sea conventions. However, their nature 
has been recognised in customary international law through State practice135 and judicial 
decisions,136 where they have been acknowledged as an enlargement of the notion of historic 
bays on historic grounds.137 Moreover, as a legal status that is not strictly limited to apply to 
bays, but one that can be equally extended to other maritime areas ‘where there is at least 
some evidence of geographical enclosure or connection with the adjacent landmass’; such is 
the case of archipelagos.138  
 As the historic title constitutes the starting point for historic waters, which would not 
be considered as internal in the absence of it, it also constitutes a derogation of the rules of 
international law in force.139 In other words, and leaving aside the fact that Ecuador does not 
justify its position under the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS, the sovereignty that it has 
exercised over the enclosed waters of the Galapagos does not contravene international law as 
it has relied on a historic title. Hence, it has complete sovereignty over this space and is under 
no legal obligation to concede navigational rights, whether it is innocent or archipelagic sea 
lanes passage,140 or freedom of fishing and any other activity permitted in a high seas regime.  
 In this regard, it should be noted that the Ecuadorian practice constitutes a claim for 
historic waters, and not a plea to acquire jurisdictional historic rights over them. The natures 
of these claims, although interrelated, are significantly different.141 Applying Symmons’ 
criteria, Ecuador has not claimed to exercise any fishing rights in international waters, as it is 
usually the case of historic rights.142 In addition, the claim carries an erga omnes effect with it 
and gives Ecuador jurisdiction and sovereignty over this space, a territorial right over this 
zone; a zone that is most of all immediately adjacent to the land domain.143  
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 Most importantly, Pharand argues, mere declarations of intention and enforcement 
measures through legislative acts are not enough.144 This exercise should be effective in 
practice, where the degree of the authority of the State is measured in accordance with the 
nature of the threat in question.145 Since the notion of unity is the base of archipelagic claims, 
states with archipelagos are not only expected, but required, to take all the adequate measures 
to protect their environment, especially the waters within the baselines that are highly 
vulnerable and where any contingency is a potential threat to the ecosystem and the 
population that depends on them.146  
 In this regard, the early recognition of the Galapagos as a single unity in the 
Ecuadorian legislation has allowed it to extend all the State machinery to protect this area. 
Aware that the Galapagos could not possibly survive without the effective protection of the 
marine ecosystem that surrounds the islands, it enacted legislation according to which it is 
entitled to exercise full jurisdiction and sovereignty over the enclosed waters of the 
archipelago.147  
 Despite the fact that the Galapagos held the status of National Park and a Marine 
Resources Reserve from several decades ago (1959 and 1986, respectively), the Ecuadorian 
government took a step further and established a Special Regime for the Conservation and 
Sustainable Development of the Province of Galapagos in 1998. 148  This extends the 
Galapagos Marine Resources Reserve to an area of 133,000km2, which comprises 50,100km2 
of inland waters and 40 additional nautical miles measured from the baselines that connect 
the outermost points of the outermost islands. As such, it was recognised in 2001 as a World 
Heritage Site by UNESCO, by virtue of its great ecological value and the uniqueness of its 
species. In response to an Ecuadorian request, the Galapagos Marine Reserve was designated 
by the IMO as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area,149 thus it is covered under a special regime 
that aims to protect this space from any possible damage caused by international maritime 
activities. Additionally, it established an Area to be Avoided where ‘all ships carrying 
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cargoes of oil or hazardous material, and of 500 gross tonnage and above should avoid 
transit’.150  
 
Galapagos Archipelago Particularly Sensitive Sea Area and Area to be Avoided Chart 
Source: IMO MEPC 53/24/Add.1 Annex 23 
 
The number of domestic and international proclamations does not only demonstrate 
the commitment of the Ecuadorian State towards the conservation of the Galapagos, but it 
affirms that it has taken ‘whatever action was necessary to exercise its exclusive and effective 																																																								
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authority over the maritime area in question’,151 which Pharand claims constitutes one of the 
key elements to claim a historic waters title.152 A decisive element also emphasised by 
Symmons, who refers to interference with navigation and fishing not only as ‘the most 
important exercises of jurisdiction for historic internal waters status’,153 but as a minimum 
requirement of assertions of this type. Certainly, there is a clear navigational restriction for 
foreign vessels in the Galapagos waters, which are not only required to have prior 
authorisation, but are completely banned to transit in the Area to be avoided. 
 As for the temporal requirement, the Ecuadorian practice has been continuous for an 
extended and uninterrupted period; and although it has demonstrated to be long (the 1934 
Decree already considered the Islands as a single unity),154 it has also been substantial in light 
of the enforcement measures taken to limit third states’ rights.155  
 Publicity is often mentioned as an important feature of historic waters,156 and in this 
respect the Ecuadorian practice is far from being hidden as it has been embodied in domestic 
legislation (from a wide set of decrees, special law and constitutional provisions) as well as in 
the international forum (through the many declarations of notorious international bodies and 
organisations). Thus, any third State objections asserting a lack of awareness of the existence 
of the enclosed waters regime of the Galapagos would be highly questionable.      
 In connection with this matter,157 the response of third states is of great importance 
concerning the acknowledgement of the existence of a claim to internal waters, especially if 
this claim were to be contrary to international law when it was first asserted.158  
 Recalling the main concerns expressed during the UNCLOS III, it was feared that the 
notion of an archipelagic regime would provoke discomfort among neighbouring states.159 
And in this regard, it is vital to distinguish the reaction of third states; moreover, since coastal 
states can only claim historic waters over areas close to their territory,160 the protest (or lack 
of it) is more determinative if it emanates from a third State whose rights are directly affected 
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by it. Hence, the need to address this subject from an inter-state perspective, and their specific 
responses to it, either protest or acquiescence.161 
 Fortunately, the Galapagos’ geographical position does not present an obstacle to 
international navigation in the Pacific Ocean.162 Likewise, their distance from the coasts of 
the continent makes the straight baseline delimitation and enclosed waters free from any 
possible delimitation conflict with neighbour continental states (Colombia and Peru).163 
Ecuador’s claim has not only been clear from protests from states of the region (the straight 
baseline method to delimit a group of islands was recognised by Peru and Chile in the 
Santiago Declaration, supplemented by the Agreement Relating to a Special Maritime 
Frontier Zone), it was also openly accepted by a great variety of states during UNCLOS III 
(Argentina, Canada, Chile, Brazil, France, India, Peru, Spain among others). 
 A special remark has to be made at this point. Despite its recent signature of 
UNCLOS, Ecuador had traditionally claimed a territorial sea of 200 nm on the grounds of the 
1952 Santiago Declaration, along with Peru and Chile. As it adhered to the 1982 Convention 
in 2012, it also agreed to 12 nm of territorial and 188 nm of EEZ. However, although the 
legal nature of a territorial sea and an EEZ differ, Ecuador has considered Costa Rica as its 
neighbor in respect of its insular territory for decades. Both states agreed to delimit their 
marine and submarine areas in 1985,164 and once they ratified the UNCLOS they convened 
for a number of technical commissions to work in the precise coordinates, equidistant and 
base points from where the geodesic boundary line between the Galapagos and Cocos Island 
shall be drawn. This process successfully concluded in the signature of the Convention on 
Maritime Delimitation of the Pacific Ocean between the Republic of Ecuador and the 
Republic of Costa Rica in April 2014,165 and in the exchange of the nautical charts by the 
presidents of both nations, in September 2016. 
Despite the success of negotiations with neighbouring states, the Galapagos 
delimitation system has been protested by the US on different occasions, when it has mainly 
challenged the use of straight baselines to measure the territorial sea, instead of the low-water 
mark around each island.166 Without any further discussion, this protest has lost relevance 
given the constant role of the US as a persistent objector to countless maritime claims, and 																																																								
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mostly because it has not effectively pursued its position.167 This is understandable since the 
Galapagos do not constitute a threat to their rights.168 Hence, the Galapagos case is nothing 
less than valid under customary international law, 169  since the international aspect of 
delimitation, as prescribed in the Fisheries case, has been successfully fulfilled. 
 Applying these considerations, the use of straight baselines to enclose the Galapagos 
is more than justified as the best available method to protect this exceptional environment. 
Simultaneously, it represents a valuable tool for Ecuador, through which it can regulate 
countless activities that could not be controlled if this area was under a high seas regime.170 
Furthermore, studies demonstrate that the difference between measuring the territorial sea 
from straight baselines around an archipelago and around each island individually, does not 
represent a considerable gain in terms of area.171 Therefore, the result of enclosing a group of 
islands under a straight baseline system versus the low-water mark is basically that the outer 
perimeter of the maritime zones is a geographic line instead of curves, which is also more 
convenient for navigational purposes because they are easier to ascertain in charts.172  
 Again, there is no major impact to the sea area, but the gain is immense in terms of 
environmental protection and enhanced security, especially because pirates and smugglers do 
not differentiate an archipelagic State from a dependent archipelago to execute their illegal 
activities, and maritime accidents and vessel collisions are not planned in advance.  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Whereas the archipelagic regime of UNCLOS may be considered unreasonable in light of its 
highly political negotiation, this in no way undermines the fact that it still constitutes a rule of 
law. To the extent that the 1982 Convention is a treaty, it is also one of the formal sources of 
rights and obligations in international law. The fact that it was envisioned to codify 
established rules of customary law and crystallise emergent norms does not mean that this 
framework has the last word in the law of the sea field either, or that it is not subject to 
evolve according to contemporary needs.173 
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 Moreover, the great acceptance of the Convention does not necessarily imply that all 
of its provisions have equally become part of customary international law,174 And in the case 
of outlying dependent archipelagos, that further State practice is banned from occuring in a 
parallel way, without being accused of unlawfulness.   
 This is certainly the case in regards mainland states and their practice of enclosing 
their outlying islands under a straight baseline system, over which enclosed waters they 
exercise jurisdiction and sovereignty. While a number of detailed studies suggest that this 
praxis is still far from being uniform and evolve into a norm of custom in international law,175 
it is also true that this possibility should not be entirely dismissed. Especially when the 
tension around these claims are -to say the least- expected when the rules governing baselines 
are manifestly vague in their content.  
 This work evidences how a singular case, allegedly not covered by the legal 
machinery of UNCLOS, can share the same spirit and urgency as those expressly protected 
by this instrument. It shows how an ‘illegal’ practice has not only been tolerated by a great 
number of states, but also protected by the international community under countless 
declarations and special regimes. This broad acceptance not only legitimises the Galapagos 
claim but it also unmasks the deficiencies of the modern law of the sea. 
 The 1982 Convention intended to limit the application of the archipelagic regime to 
State archipelagos on the grounds of statehood. Ironically, the international community now 
faces a greater challenge than the one of proliferation of claims that it feared during the 
UNCLOS III negotiations. The possible evolution of the practice of outlying dependent 
archipelagos into a norm of custom could create a bizarre parallel system, one even more 
beneficial than Part IV, one where navigational rights and similar concessions are not 
included for third parties.176  
 As for the Galapagos, Ecuador has acted in the firm belief that its practice is coherent 
with international law, and there is enough material to demonstrate that it has been 
consistently performed for a long period of time.  
  However, the possession of a historic title over waters does not constitute a malicious 
appropriation of territory, but rather a legitimate claim that also entails a number of 
obligations for the Ecuadorian State, a small developing country which is also responsible of 
exercising effective control over the waters under its jurisdiction. Hence, the reading in the 																																																								
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Galapagos case (and archipelagos in general) should adopt a water-based approach, rather 
than one relying on a straight baseline method. To this end, if archipelagos consist of ‘a sea 
or stretch of water having many islands’, then the only viable method to enclose these 
features and preserve their unity is a straight baseline system. A drawing that has been 
traditionally stigmatised as it appears to carry expansionist intentions, a belief that the 
Galapagos case hopes to prove wrong. 
 Finally, archipelagos are generally vulnerable and demand to be protected under the 
law. Before a silent UNCLOS and a decentralised international law system, the logical 
response would be to allow State practice to continue taking its course and consolidate as a 
rule of international law. A rule that so far demonstrates to have no intention to modify the 
1982 Convention or contravene its spirit, but rather complement its provisions now that time 
has evidenced them reasonable for modern needs. 
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